

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 056881

43

ORIGIN SP-02

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SS-15 EUR-12 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 L-02 OES-03 SAJ-01 /057 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:MHARMACOST:VB

APPROVED BY S/P:SLEWIS

EUR/SOV:BMZOOK (DRAFT)

INR/RES/FP:IBELOUSOVITCH(DRAFT)

INR/REA:RLWILLIAMS (DRAFT)

EA/PRCM:JITAYLOR(DRAFT)

EA/J:DBROWN (DRAFT)

----- 045455

R 132311Z MAR 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

S E C R E T STATE 056881

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR JA

SUBJECT: PLANNING TALKS PAPER ON TRENDS IN SINO-SOVIET

-- RELATIONS

1. WE ARE TRANSMITTING IN THIS CABLE THE PLANNING TALKS DISCUSSION PAPER ON TRENDS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. OTHER PAPERS ON KOREA AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES WILL FOLLOW. REQUEST EMBASSY PASS THESE TO PLANNING DIRECTOR KAGAMI.

2. WE LOOK FORWARD TO AMBASSADOR HODGSON'S PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS. THE AGENDA REMAINS AS INDICATED IN OUR PREVIOUS EXCHANGES ON THE SUBJECT. IN RESPONSE TO FON OFF REQUEST WE WILL TAKE THE KOREAN ITEM UP FIRST. DEPARTURE FOR CHARLOTTESVILLE PLANNED FOR 10:15 A.M. ON MARCH 26. WE WILL RETURN ON MARCH 28 IN TIME FOR A LUNCHEON ON THE 8TH FLOOR. AMBASSADOR YASUKAWA IS PLANNING TO HOST A BUFFET DINNER FOR DELEGATIONS ON EVENING OF MARCH 25.

3. SINO-SOVIET PAPER FOLLOWS: (NOTE: THE CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 056881

OF THIS PAPER IS SECRET.)

BEGIN TEXT: (BEGIN UNDERLINE)

CURRENT TENDENCIES IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS (THIS

PAPER HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED AS AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT AND REPRESENTS THE VIEWS OF THE DRAFTER.)

THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE THE FOCAL POINT OF DIPLOMATIC TENSION IN THE FAR EAST FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL MORE YEARS. (END UNDERLINE) THE SOURCES OF THIS RIVALRY ARE DEEP-ROOTED. THEY INCLUDE THE UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL ISSUE, IDEOLOGICAL CONTENTION, CONFLICTS OF POWER, RANK, AND AMBITION WITHIN THE COMMUNIST WORLD, THE ANIMOSITIES OF KEY PERSONALITIES, THE CLASSIC RIVALRY OF POWERFUL NEIGHBORING STATES, THE LOGIC OF MILITARY COMPETITION, RACIAL ANXIETIES, RESENTMENTS NURTURED BY PAST POLICIES OF THE RIVAL, AND THE INFLUENCE OF OUTSIDERS IN EXACERBATING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE.

BOTH POSSESS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TACTICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR EMPHASIZING THE OTHER'S PERFIDY. THE SOVIETS SPEAK OF CHINA'S LUST FOR POWER IN ASIA AND UNRELIABILITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR AND NEIGHBOR. EMPHASIS ON THE "THREAT" POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION IS UTILIZED BY THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO SUSTAIN DOMESTIC SOLIDARITY AND TO RATIONALIZE ITS VARYING INJUNCTIONS--TO THE WEST, TO KEEP ITS GUARD UP; TO THE JAPANESE; TO MAINTAIN A HARD LINE ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE; AND TO THE UNITED STATES, TO AVOID INDULGING IN ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE AND PROSPECTS OF DETENTE WITH THE RUSSIANS. IN SHORT, WE EXPECT THE RIVALRY TO CONTINUE AS A PROMINENT FEATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRAIN. WITHIN THE ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME POTENTIAL FOR LESSENING OF TENSIONS AND GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN DEALING WITH BILATERAL ISSUES.

A. (UNDERLINE) CURRENT SITUATION

(UNDERLINE) AT PRESENT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE POOR BUT WE DISCERN NO PARTICULAR TREND TOWARD FURTHER  
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 056881

DETERIORATION. (END UNDERLINE)

-- THE BORDER TALKS REMAIN STALEMATED, ALTHOUGH THE CHIEF SOVIET NEGOTIATOR, ILICHEV, RETURNED TO PEKING IN MID-FEBRUARY FOR FURTHER TALKS. THE LAST ANNUAL NAVIGATION TALKS MAINTAINED THE NORMAL ACROMONY.

-- SINO-SOVIET TRADE IS AT A PLATEAU--SLIGHTLY OVER \$200 MILLION--AND WE SEE NO INDICATION IT WILL GROW OR DECLINE SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE NEAR TERM.

-- THE PRESENT LEVEL OF VITUPERATION IN SOVIET AND CHINESE PROPAGANDA IS ABOUT PAR FOR THE COURSE. FOR

THE MOMENT AT LEAST, THE CHINESE ARE DOWNGRADING THE NEAR TERM SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO THE PRC. CHINA'S NON-AGGRESSION PACT PROPOSAL WAS MADE PUBLIC LAST NOVEMBER LARGELY FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, AND WAS SWIFTLY REJECTED AS OFFERING NOTHING NEW, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN PROBING CHINESE INTENTIONS MORE DEEPLY.

(BEGIN UNDERLINE) THE MILITARY BALANCE REMAINS MUCH THE SAME. (END UNDERLINE)

-- STRATEGICALLY THE CHINESE MISSILE FORCES CONTINUE TO GROW SLOWLY. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW ESTIMATE THAT THE PRC HAS DEPLOYED ABOUT 70 MISSILES, BUT THEY CANNOT BE CONFIDENT OF THE COMPLETENESS OF THEIR COUNT OR OF THEIR ABILITY TO TARGET ALL CHINESE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN A FIRST STRIKE ATTACK.

-- IN THE BORDER REGIONS THE SOVIETS ARE GRADUALLY FILLING OUT THE ROUGHLY 45 DIVISIONS ALREADY DEPLOYED, MANY OF WHICH REMAIN UNDERSTRENGTH, BUT THE SOVIET BUILD-UP HAS BEEN LEVELING OFF.

-- BASICALLY THE CHINESE GROUND FORCES ARE POSITIONED TO DRAW SOVIET ATTACK INTO THE INTERIOR AND TO ENGAGE IT THERE WITH SUPERIOR NUMBERS.

(UNDERLINE) THE OUTCOME OF THE RECENT NATIONAL SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 056881

PEOPLES CONGRESS IN CHINA SUGGESTS CONTINUITY IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICIES, INCLUDING A STIFF LINE TOWARD THE USSR. (END UNDERLINE)

-- HOWEVER, THE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING BOTH POLICIES AND THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP ARE FAR FROM CLEAR. WHILE THERE IS SURFACE UNITY, EVIDENCE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE RESULTING LEADERSHIP REFLECTS A DELICATE BALANCE OR EVEN DEADLOCK BETWEEN CONTENDING FORCES, WITH THE RISE OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING AND CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO CREATING A TRIUMVIRATE IN A CONVOLUTED AND POSSIBLY UNSTABLE POWER STRUCTURE.

-- THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, TO SUGGEST ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES.

(UNDERLINE) IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES ON THE CURRENT DOCKET MAY RAISE THE TEMPERATURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. (END UNDERLINE)

-- RECENT REPORTS HINT AT SOME RENEWAL OF TENSIONS

OF THE BORDERS, THOUGH THEIR ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS ARE FAR FROM CLEAR.

-- THE CHINESE ARE STILL HOLDING A CAPTURED SOVIET HELICOPTER CREW. IF THEY PLACE THEM ON TRIAL, THIS WOULD SUGGEST THAT CHINESE LEADERS SEE SOME DOMESTIC POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE, ALTHOUGH A TRIAL FOLLOWED BY EXPULSION WOULD BE A WAY OF CLOSING THE EPISODE.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE GRADUALLY MOVING TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONCLAVE IN LATE 1975 OR 1976. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT MANY SPEECHES AT THIS MEETING WILL CONVEY A STRONG ANTI-CHINESE FLAVOR, ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL CONDEMNATION OF PEKING WILL BE SOUGHT. CHINA WILL RESPOND NO DOUBT WITH POLEMICS AND INSISTENCE THAT THE ASIAN PARTIES STAY AWAY.

B. (UNDERLINE) PERSPECTIVE FROM MOSCOW  
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 056881

(UNDERLINE) THE IMAGE WHICH MOSCOW SEEKS TO PROJECT AT PRESENT IS ONE OF PATIENCE AND LONG SUFFERING BUT EXPECTANT WAITING. (END UNDERLINE) THE SOVIETS PERIODICALLY REPEAT OFFERS WITH APPARENT CONCILIATORY INTENT, AND EVIDENTLY WANT TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR TIES WITH THE PRC. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH US AND OTHER WESTERNERS, SOVIET OFFICIALS CAUTIOUSLY ADVANCE THE IDEA THAT, AFTER MAO, CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MAY EVENTUALLY IMPROVE.

-- THIS LINE IS IN PART TACTICAL; THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW WHETHER MAO'S PASSING WILL MOVE CHINA IN THEIR DIRECTION.

-- CAMPAIGNS CONTINUE IN CHINA AGAINST LIN PAO FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, HIS ALLEGED PRO-SOVIET LEANINGS. THIS MUST SURELY SUGGEST TO THE SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MAY BE A STRATUM OF THE LEADERSHIP FAVORABLY

DISPOSED TO IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS CAN IDENTIFY KEY CHINESE LEADERS WHO MIGHT HAVE SUCH AN ORIENTATION.

-- THE OUTCOME OF THE RECENT PEOPLES CONGRESS OFFERED THE SOVIETS LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THEY WILL SOON ESCAPE THE STATUS OF CHINA'S NUMBER ONE ENEMY.

(UNDERLINE) UNLESS SOVIET LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO USE FORCE, THEY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO NOURISH THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME FUTURE RAPPROCHEMENT. (END UNDERLINE)

-- THIS APPROACH CALLS FOR AVOIDING FURTHER DETERIORATION IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND CONVEYING, TO ANY CHINESE WHO MAY BE LISTENING, THE VIEW THAT THE USSR IS PREPARING FOR A HONORABLE ACCOMMODATION.

-- WE TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT IT ALSO CALLS FOR SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS, BUT CHINA IS NOT READILY SUBVERTED.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 056881

(UNDERLINE) THE SOVIETS ARE OF COURSE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THEIR BORDERS, BUT THEY SEE NO MAJOR MILITARY THREAT AT PRESENT FROM CHINA. (END UNDERLINE) THEIR PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION IS RATHER WITH THE PRC'S POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SINO-US, OR SINO-JAPANESE, COLLUSION AT THEIR EXPENSE.

-- THE IDEA OF A SURGICAL MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CHINA PROBLEM MUST APPEAR INCREASINGLY UNTHINKABLE AS CHINA'S NUCLEAR MISSILE CAPABILITY INCREASES.

(UNDERLINE) CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE SETTLED DOWN FOR LONG-TERM COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION IN WHICH THEY WILL SEEK TO COUNTER CHINESE DIPLOMATIC THRUSTS AND WHEREVER POSSIBLE WEAKEN AND EMBARRASS THE CHINESE WORLD POSITION. (END UNDERLINE)

-- THE SOVIETS PROBABLY BELIEVE THAT ONCE MAO IS GONE, BARRING AN UNEXPECTED WINDFALL, THE NEXT GENERATION OF CHINESE LEADERS WILL CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME--PERHAPS AS MUCH AS A DECADE--TO GIVE PRECEDENCE TO THE SECTARIAN STRUGGLE WITH SOVIET REVISIONISM AND TO CARVING OUT A GREAT POWER ROLE FOR THE PRC.

-- IN THE EVENT OF CRISIS WITH CHINA, THE USSR MIGHT CONTEMPLATE USING FRONTIER TENSION AS A PRESSURE POINT AGAINST THE PRC. NATURALLY THEY WOULD BE ALERT TO EXPLOIT ANY SIGNS OF WEAKNESS OR POLITICAL DIVISION WITHIN CHINA.

C. (UNDERLINE) PERSPECTIVE FROM PEKING

(UNDERLINE) THE CURRENT CHINESE PUBLIC POSITION IS THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS REMAIN AS REPREHENSIBLE AS EVER THE DIRECT MILITARY THREAT THEY POSE HAS DECLINED. (END UNDERLINE) THIS IS PROBABLY ALSO PEKING'S REAL APPRAISAL IN VIEW OF THE SLACKING OFF OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, THE GROWTH IN CHINA'S OWN STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, AND THE ADDITIONAL DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY CHINA'S IMPROVED POLITICAL TIES WITH THE UNITED

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 056881

STATES AND JAPAN. OTHER MORE TACTICAL FACTORS ARE ALSO PROBABLY INVOLVED.

-- PEKING WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE STRONG WESTERN DEFENSES AND COUNTER PRESSURES ON MOSCOW BY ARGUING THAT THE REAL SOVIET THREAT IS TO EUROPE. THEY CONTINUE TO WARN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US ABOUT THE "ILLUSIONS OF DETENTE."

-- BY PROJECTING THE IMAGE OF REDUCED CHINESE CONCERN, PEKING MAY HOPE TO REDUCE OUR BARGAINING LEVERAGE ON CHINA.

-- THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP MAY BE ANXIOUS TO COUNTER THE ARGUMENTS OF DOMESTIC CRITICS WHO CONTEND THAT CHINA MUST BEEF UP ITS MILITARY FORCES BECAUSE OF TENSIONS WITH MOSCOW.

-- THE CHINESE MAY WANT TO AVOID CREATING AN IMPRESSION THAT THEIR MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY MOTIVATION IS FEAR OF THE SOVIETS.

(UNDERLINE) NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS THE PRC'S OVERRIDING SECURITY CONCERN. (END UNDERLINE)

-- PEKING IS STILL "STORING GRAIN AND DIGGING TUNNELS" FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCIES AS WELL AS TO HEDGE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR CALCULATIONS REGARDING SOVIET NEAR TERM INTENTIONS PROVE MISTAKEN.

-- THE BASIC CHINESE CONCERN IS A FEAR OF GRADUAL GEOPOLITICAL ENCIRCLEMENT BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CLIENTS RATHER THAN OF ANY IMMEDIATE MILITARY MOVE.

(UNDERLINE) COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOCUSES THE PRIORITIES OF CHINESE DIPLOMACY. (END UNDERLINE) FOR SOME TIME PEKING HAS BEEN SEEKING TO COUNTER LONG RANGE SOVIET OBJECTIVES, WHICH IN ITS VIEW INCLUDE: THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE US FROM INVOLVEMENT IN EURASIAN SECURITY; THE FINLANDIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET HEGEMONY  
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 056881

IN THE MIDDLE EAST; AND THE ISOLATION OF CHINA AROUND ITS ASIAN PERIPHERY. SOVIET MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE INDIAN OCEAN, PERSIAN GULF, WEST AND SOUTH ASIA, AS WELL AS BREZHNEV'S RECURRENT EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM CONFIRM TO THE CHINESE THEIR

VIEW OF THE LONG RANGE SOVIET DRIVE TO DOMINATE EURASIA  
AND ULTIMATELY TO BRING CHINA TO HEEL.

ASIDE FROM THE MAJOR EFFORTS PEKING HAS MADE TO  
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND TOKYO, (UNDERLINE)  
A PRIME FOCUS OF CHINA'S DIPLOMACY IS AN AREA RANGING  
FROM MALTA IN THE WEST, ISLAMABAD IN THE EAST,  
DAR-ES-SALAAM IN THE SOUTH, AND BUCHAREST IN THE NORTH.  
(END UNDERLINE) IN THIS REGION THEY SEEK TO UNDERMINE  
SOVIET INFLUENCE WHILE CREATING A ZONE OF STATES FRIENDLY  
TO CHINA ON THE SOVIET UNION'S SOUTHERN FLANK. CON-  
VERSELY THEY SEEK TO DENY THE USSR AN EXCLUSIVE SPHERE  
OF INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR EAST THAT WOULD ENABLE RUSSIA  
TO TREAT THE BLACK SEA, THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, THE  
PERSIAN GULF, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A STRATEGIC UNITY.

(UNDERLINE) A KEY DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAST YEAR THAT  
HAS AFFECTED CHINA'S PERCEPTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS  
AND CAPABILITIES IS THE ECONOMIC CRISIS BESETTING THE  
WEST AND JAPAN. (END UNDERLINE) THE CHINESE APPEAR  
CONCERNED THAT AN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY CRISIS COULD  
WEAKEN THE WEST'S WILL AND CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN ITS  
DEFENSES AND COULD ENCOURAGE EXCESSIVE WESTERN CONCESSIONS  
IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND/OR THE MBFR  
NEGOTIATIONS. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES IN NATO'S SOUTHERN  
FLANK HAVE ALSO HEIGHTENED CHINA'S CONCERN OVER THE  
UNPREDICTABILITY OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS. THUS THEY  
MUST CONTEMPLATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A WRENCHING ON THE  
GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE SOVIET UNION  
AS THEY SHAPE THEIR OWN POSTURE TOWARD MOSCOW. DESPITE  
THESE CONCERNS, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE AGGRESSIVELY

ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH THIRD WORLD DEMANDS FOR MAJOR  
ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS.  
THERE IS A BASIC CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THEIR PUBLIC  
RHETORIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES.

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 056881

D. (UNDERLINE) THE ASIAN QUADRILATERAL

(UNDERLINE) THE SOVIETS SEEM TO FEEL THEY HAVE MADE  
SOME PROGRESS IN BALANCING RELATIONS WITH CHINA, THE US,  
AND JAPAN. (END UNDERLINE)

-- THEY HAVE DEVELOPED RELATIONS WITH THE US WHICH  
THEY BELIEVE WILL REMAIN MORE IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED  
STATES THAN ITS DEALINGS WITH PEKING. THIS BELIEF  
APPEARS UNCHANGED DESPITE RECENT DIFFICULTIES OVER  
TRADE AND EMIGRATION.

-- THEY ARE COMFORTED TEMPORARILY BY WHAT THEY  
PERCEIVE TO BE DIFFICULTIES IN THE SINO-US RELATIONSHIP

FLOWING FROM THE TAIWAN ISSUE.

-- THEY HAVE PROBABLY IMPROVED THEIR RELATIVE POSITION IN HANOI VIS-A-VIS PEKING, BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN ASIA HAVE NOT BEEN SO FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIETS, E.G., THE IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA AS WELL AS BETWEEN CHINA AND SEVERAL OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES.

-- THEY ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THE STATE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, MOST PARTICULARLY TOKYO'S APPARENT RESOLVE TO PURSUE A PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE PRC WHILE SETTING ASIDE THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS.

(UNDERLINE) AS FOR THE CHINESE, CONTROLLED HOSTILITY TOWARD THE SOVIETS MAY APPEAR MORE ADVANTAGEOUS THAN UNDERTAKING SERIOUS GESTURES TOWARD RECONCILIATION. (END UNDERLINE) A RELATIONSHIP OF CONTROLLED HOSTILITY WITH THE USSR SERVES TO BOLSTER UNITY AT HOME. FURTHERMORE, THE CHINESE HAVE UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, GENERALLY GOOD AND IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH OTHER POWERS IN ASIA INCLUDING THE US AND ARE NOT UNDER PRESSURE TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS. THE CHINESE ARE AWARE, MOREOVER, THAT ANY RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES AT THIS TIME WOULD FAVOR SOVIET POSITIONS BECAUSE  
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 056881

OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THE POWER BALANCE.

-- THE CHINESE CONTINUE INDIRECTLY TO INDICATE THAT IN ORDER TO ADVANCE SINO-US RELATIONS THE TAIWAN QUESTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES MUST BE RESOLVED. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, PEKING CONTINUES TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH THE STATE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE US AND TO SHOW PATIENCE ABOUT PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION.

-- THE PRC HAS OPENLY ENCOURAGED CONTINUATION OF A CLOSE US-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING MILITARY TIES. MEANWHILE, CHINA IS CONCENTRATING ON CONSOLIDATING ITS OWN COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN, AS IN ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS AND BY MEANS OF INCREASED OIL EXPORTS.

-- ELSEWHERE IN ASIA THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO PICTURE THE SOVIETS AS THE MAIN THREAT AND IMPLICITLY ENDORSE US POWER IN THE AREA AS A COUNTER TO SOVIET AMBITIONS. THE PRC'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NEO-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ARE BEGINNING TO BEAR FRUIT.

-- IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA NEITHER CHINA NOR THE SOVIET UNION HAS RELAXED DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR THE



DPRK OR SHOWN INTEREST IN PROMOTING A SOUTH-NORTH ACCOMMODATION. PEKING, HOWEVER, APPEARS PRESENTLY TO BE THE DPRK'S MOST FAVORED FRATERNAL FRIEND, WHILE THE SOVIETS MIGHT POSSIBLY FAVOR SOME DEGREE OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA.

E. (UNDERLINE) FUTURE PROSPECTS (END UNDERLINE)

FOR THE LONGER FUTURE IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ASSUME THAT THE PRESENT LEVELS OF CONTENTION AND RIVALRY ARE INEVITABLE AND FOREORDAINED. SINCE MOST ANALYSTS OVERLOOKED THE POTENTIAL OF A SINO-SOVIET RIFT IN THE FIFTIES AND EARLY SIXTIES, IT IS ONLY PRUDENT TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME MOVES BY THEM TOWARD DETENTE WITHIN AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP. IN THIS CONNECTION SEVERAL FACTORS MIGHT ALTER THE CURRENT PATTERN OF RELATIONS:

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 056881

-- BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE CURRENT ASIAN QUADRILATERAL IS UNBALANCED, AND THEIR MUTUAL HOSTILITY DEPRIVES BOTH OF DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERABILITY VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. BOTH TOKYO AND WASHINGTON HAVE MOVED ADROITLY TO EXPLOIT THEIR UNFRIENDLY RELATIONS. THEY DOUBTLESS RECOGNIZE THAT THIS HOSTILITY AFFORDED A DIPLOMATIC OPPORTUNITY TO JAPAN AND THE US IN THE LATE SIXTIES AND LED TO THE

REVISION OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICIES TOWARD CHINA IN A DIRECTION FAVORABLE TO THE PRC.

-- THUS MOSCOW HAS A STRONG BALANCE OF POWER INCENTIVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF UNDERMINING CHINA'S POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE. THE PRC ALSO HAS AN INCENTIVE TO IMPROVE THESE RELATIONS IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR PRESSURE ON THE BORDER ISSUE, IN ADDITION TO THE LEVERAGE CHINA WOULD GAIN IN DEALING WITH THE US AND JAPAN.

-- BOTH RUSSIAN AND CHINESE LEADERSHIP IS AGING. THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE IS UNDER WAY IN CHINA AND IS BEGINNING IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SIMULTANEOUS SUCCESSION CRISES IN BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD INTRODUCE A GENUINE NOTE OF UNPREDICTABILITY.

-- THE IMPONDERABLES OF THE CURRENT WORLD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION AMPLIFY THESE UNCERTAINTIES. FROM CHINA'S VANTAGE POINT, THE ECONOMIC HEALTH AND STRENGTH OF THE WEST HAVE SERVED AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC DISARRAY IN THE WEST RELIEVES SOME OF THE PRESSURES ON THE USSR EVEN AS IT

PRESUMABLY CREATES SOME ANXIETIES IN BOTH PEKING AND MOSCOW. CHINESE CONCERNS MUST BE HEIGHTENED BY THE PERCEPTION THAT SUBTLE SHIFTS IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE MAY WORK TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE USSR. THEY ARE SURELY SENSITIVE TO ANY EVIDENCE OF DECLINING US CAPABILITY OR WILL MANIFESTED IN DECISIONS OF THE US EXECUTIVE BRANCH OR RESTRICTIONS ON ITS FREEDOM OF SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 056881

ACTION ESTABLISHED BY THE CONGRESS OR A WEARY AMERICAN PUBLIC. INDEED, AS THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAVE SHIFTED LEADERS DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS, THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS DOUBTLESS MUST RECKON WITH POTENTIAL SUCCESSION PROBLEMS IN BOTH THESE COUNTRIES AS WELL, THUS COMPOUNDING THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY MUST FORMULATE THEIR POLICIES.

(UNDERLINE) THUS THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN CHINA IS LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE NEW THINKING, HOWEVER GUARDED, IN PEKING AND CERTAINLY IN MOSCOW ABOUT THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. (END UNDERLINE) PERHAPS THE FIRST EVIDENCE OF A SERIOUS EFFORT TO COMPOSE FORMAL DIFFERENCES WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE BORDER DISPUTE. THIS HAS BEEN PRESENTLY DEADLOCKED FOR SEVERAL YEARS OVER THE CHINESE INSISTENCE THAT THE SOVIETS FIRST WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM MORE THAN 20,000 SQUARE

KILOMETERS OF THE PAMIRS AND FROM ISLANDS IN THE MANCHURIAN BORDER RIVERS, WHICH ARE IN DISPUTE.

-- IN ITS ABSOLUTE FORM, THIS DEMAND IS UNACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW. AMONG OTHER THINGS IT WOULD MEAN UNCOVERING KHABAROVSK, AN IMPORTANT RAILHEAD ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD.

-- BUT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT WHOLLY ADAMANT. THEY HAVE MADE SOME TOKEN WITHDRAWALS FROM A FEW ISLANDS AND HAVE OFFERED TO CEDE SOME 400 SMALL ISLANDS IN A GENERAL SETTLEMENT.

-- GIVEN SOME GENERAL INDICATION OF A CHINESE DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, IT IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION THE SOVIETS WOULD MAKE SOME GESTURES OR PARTIAL CONCESSIONS IN THIS MATTER TO UNLOCK THE LARGER STALEMATE.

F. (UNDERLINE) KEY ISSUES (END UNDERLINE)

1. THE INCIPIENT STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION NOW UNDERWAY IN CHINA MAY BE THE MOST IMMEDIATELY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. IS THERE SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 056881

EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE RECENT NPC IN CHINA WILL RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN PRC FOREIGN POLICY? WHAT BENEFITS, OTHER THAN REDUCTION OF BORDER TENSIONS, MIGHT LEAD THE CHINESE LEADERS--NOW OR AFTER MAO--TO CONSIDER THAT IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WAS TO CHINA'S ADVANTAGE?

2. JAPAN'S IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH PEKING ARE CAUSING CONCERN IN MOSCOW AND HAVE LED TO SOME SOVIET MEDDLING IN TOKYO. DO THE JAPANESE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE WANT TO GO FARTHER IN THE DIRECTION OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, AS BY SETTling THE SENKAKU ISSUE, OR BY MODIFYING THEIR INSISTENCE ON "SELF-RELIANCE" IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, OR EXPANDING THEIR "RESOURCE DIPLOMACY" WITH JAPAN? WILL STEPS SUCH AS THESE CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO CONSIDER THAT THE JAPANESE-CHINESE-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS BECOME MARKEDLY UNBALANCED TO THE DIS-ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIETS? DO THE JAPANESE FORESEE POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS, AS BY CONCESSIONS ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES OR FURTHER OFFERS OF RESOURCE DEALS, OR ALTERNATIVELY BY NEW SOVIET APPROACHES TO CHINA?

3. CHINA ASSERTS RHETORICALLY THAT IT IS PART OF THE THIRD WORLD. WHY THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON THE THIRD WORLD IN CHINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? IS ITS SUPPORT OF THIRD WORLD POSITIONS AS IN THE UN OR IN RESOURCES DIPLOMACY LIKELY TO CONFLICT WITH ITS POLICIES OF DEVELOPING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, STEP-BY-STEP IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE US, ENCOURAGEMENT OF A STRONGER WESTERN EUROPE VIS-A-VIS THE USSR? ARE CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION LIKELY TO HAVE SERIOUS CLASHES OF INTEREST IN DEALING WITH THE THIRD WORLD? HOW DO MOSCOW AND PEKING REALLY VIEW THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DISLOCATIONS IN THE WEST AND JAPAN? END TEXT. INGERSOLL

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLICIES, PLANNING MEETINGS, SINO SOVIET DISPUTES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 13 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** KelleyW0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE056881  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** S/P:MHARMACOST:VB  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750089-1109  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750399/baaaague.tel  
**Line Count:** 580  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SP  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 11  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** KelleyW0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 10 JUN 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <10 JUN 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <21 OCT 2003 by KelleyW0>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, JA, US, UR, CH  
**To:** TOKYO  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006